Article 74 of MiCA requires providers of the services covered by Articles 75 to 79 to maintain a plan supporting an orderly wind-down under national law. The plan must address continuity or recovery of critical activities and demonstrate that the provider can close without causing undue economic harm to clients. Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on markets in crypto-assets
Follow the evidence
Trace how the event could reach markets, then inspect a competing explanation.
Compare explanations
Switch lenses to see what each account explains—and what remains uncertain.
A credible plan maps how client assets and access credentials will be reconciled, transferred or returned. It should address unresolved transactions, fees, complaints and assets on networks experiencing congestion or suspension. The firm also needs reliable contact data and a communication sequence that distinguishes confirmed instructions from phishing attempts. Critical vendors may have to operate after revenue falls. Contracts should therefore cover continued service, data export and transition support. A provider that cannot access its own books, wallet records or customer files after terminating a vendor cannot execute an orderly closure merely because the policy document says it will. Testing can use a tabletop scenario in which authorisation is withdrawn, capital falls below thresholds or a core service becomes unavailable. The exercise should identify decision points, manual workarounds and client impacts. Remediation belongs in the plan’s version history rather than being left as an informal lesson.
A credible plan maps how client assets and access credentials will be reconciled, transferred or returned. It should address unresolved transactions, fees, complaints and assets on networks experiencing congestion or suspension. The firm also needs reliable contact data and a communication sequence that distinguishes confirmed instructions from phishing attempts. Critical vendors may have to operate after revenue falls. Contracts should therefore cover continued service, data export and transition support. A provider that cannot access its own books, wallet records or customer files after terminating a vendor cannot execute an orderly closure merely because the policy document says it will. Testing can use a tabletop scenario in which authorisation is withdrawn, capital falls below thresholds or a core service becomes unavailable. The exercise should identify decision points, manual workarounds and client impacts. Remediation belongs in the plan’s version history rather than being left as an informal lesson.
Before committing significant assets, clients can ask who holds them, what records prove entitlement, how transfers work and which entity communicates during disruption. Terms should explain termination and withdrawal processes. A provider’s wind-down plan may not be public in full, but customer-facing arrangements should not contradict it. Clients should maintain their own transaction records, wallet addresses and statements. That does not replace the provider’s books, but it can help establish a claim and detect inconsistencies. Seed phrases and authentication secrets should never be sent in response to an unsolicited closure or recovery message. Article 74 does not make failure harmless. It requires preparation that can reduce disorder and preserve critical functions. Combined with prudential, custody, outsourcing and complaint rules, it creates a lifecycle view of protection: authorisation and growth are not enough; a regulated service also needs a credible way to stop.
The rule applies before failure, not after operations have already stopped
The covered service range includes custody and administration, operating a trading platform, exchanging crypto-assets for funds or other crypto-assets, and executing orders. These activities can hold assets, records or market access that clients need even when the provider is no longer taking new business. Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on markets in crypto-assets
An orderly plan is different from a growth strategy or ordinary incident response. It starts from a controlled reduction or termination of business. The provider needs to identify critical functions, legal entities, client obligations, dependencies, funding needs, records and decision authorities that remain active during the wind-down.
MiCA does not prescribe one universal liquidation timetable in Article 74. Applicable national law and the provider’s service model affect the process. The regulatory standard is the ability to support an orderly outcome without undue client harm, not a promise that every asset can be returned instantly or at its original market value.
Asset return, records and communications must keep working during closure
A credible plan maps how client assets and access credentials will be reconciled, transferred or returned. It should address unresolved transactions, fees, complaints and assets on networks experiencing congestion or suspension. The firm also needs reliable contact data and a communication sequence that distinguishes confirmed instructions from phishing attempts.
Critical vendors may have to operate after revenue falls. Contracts should therefore cover continued service, data export and transition support. A provider that cannot access its own books, wallet records or customer files after terminating a vendor cannot execute an orderly closure merely because the policy document says it will.
Testing can use a tabletop scenario in which authorisation is withdrawn, capital falls below thresholds or a core service becomes unavailable. The exercise should identify decision points, manual workarounds and client impacts. Remediation belongs in the plan’s version history rather than being left as an informal lesson.
Continuity information matters before a platform is distressed
Before committing significant assets, clients can ask who holds them, what records prove entitlement, how transfers work and which entity communicates during disruption. Terms should explain termination and withdrawal processes. A provider’s wind-down plan may not be public in full, but customer-facing arrangements should not contradict it.
Clients should maintain their own transaction records, wallet addresses and statements. That does not replace the provider’s books, but it can help establish a claim and detect inconsistencies. Seed phrases and authentication secrets should never be sent in response to an unsolicited closure or recovery message.
Article 74 does not make failure harmless. It requires preparation that can reduce disorder and preserve critical functions. Combined with prudential, custody, outsourcing and complaint rules, it creates a lifecycle view of protection: authorisation and growth are not enough; a regulated service also needs a credible way to stop.