Financial firms closed 238,396 suspected money-mule accounts in 2025, according to an FCA survey published September 23, 2026. The comparable totals were 233,269 in 2024 and 184,935 in 2023. The FCA cautioned that more closures may reflect customer growth and improved detection, rather than proving that suspected mules form a larger share of firms’ business. FCA: Firms crack down on money mules but need to do more
Follow the evidence
Trace how the event could reach markets, then inspect a competing explanation.
Compare explanations
Switch lenses to see what each account explains—and what remains uncertain.
Brokers and other financial firms can map account-opening data, device information, funding sources, beneficiaries, velocity and linked accounts. A useful alert should explain the observed pattern and why it differs from expected activity. Volume alone can produce false positives when it ignores the customer’s legitimate profile. Escalation needs both speed and review. Firms may need to restrict transfers while investigating, but indefinite action without ownership or communication creates customer harm. Decision records should show the evidence considered, reviewers involved, legal basis and route for correcting an error. Criminal networks adapt to controls, so static rules degrade. Firms should analyse confirmed cases and harmless alerts, then test new scenarios with privacy and fairness safeguards. Shared intelligence may help connect activity across institutions, but data quality and access limits remain essential.
Brokers and other financial firms can map account-opening data, device information, funding sources, beneficiaries, velocity and linked accounts. A useful alert should explain the observed pattern and why it differs from expected activity. Volume alone can produce false positives when it ignores the customer’s legitimate profile. Escalation needs both speed and review. Firms may need to restrict transfers while investigating, but indefinite action without ownership or communication creates customer harm. Decision records should show the evidence considered, reviewers involved, legal basis and route for correcting an error. Criminal networks adapt to controls, so static rules degrade. Firms should analyse confirmed cases and harmless alerts, then test new scenarios with privacy and fairness safeguards. Shared intelligence may help connect activity across institutions, but data quality and access limits remain essential.
Customers whose accounts are restricted should use the firm’s verified complaint and information channels, preserve transfer records and provide a concise explanation of legitimate activity. They should not pay an intermediary who claims it can remove a fraud marker or guarantee restoration of access. Consumer communication must balance transparency with the risk that detailed rules could help criminals adapt. Firms can still identify the affected service, information needed, review route and expected communication process. Silence or contradictory instructions can push legitimate customers toward impersonators offering false assistance. The FCA data show more action against suspected mule accounts, not the end of mule activity and not proof that every closure was correct. The strongest operational response combines targeted detection, human review, documented escalation and a workable correction path for customers who can substantiate legitimate transactions across the market.
Closures increased while criminal networks adapted their routes
The FCA said organised groups continue to move illicit funds through multiple accounts before cashing out. It cited a National Crime Agency estimate that more than £100 billion is laundered through the UK or UK corporate structures each year. Money-mule activity is one route within that much larger estimate, not the full amount. FCA: Firms crack down on money mules but need to do more
Account closures were highest among customers aged 26 to 39, at 91,073. The sharpest increase reported by the FCA was among customers aged 40 to 49, rising from 25,760 in 2024 to 37,274 in 2025. Age figures describe detected cases; they do not establish that every person in a group carries the same risk.
A suspected-mule closure is not equivalent to a criminal conviction. Firms act under account terms, financial-crime controls and legal duties, using evidence available at the time. The official release supports trend analysis but does not publish a probability that an individual transaction or customer is illicit.
Detection must connect onboarding, transactions and cash-out behaviour
Brokers and other financial firms can map account-opening data, device information, funding sources, beneficiaries, velocity and linked accounts. A useful alert should explain the observed pattern and why it differs from expected activity. Volume alone can produce false positives when it ignores the customer’s legitimate profile.
Escalation needs both speed and review. Firms may need to restrict transfers while investigating, but indefinite action without ownership or communication creates customer harm. Decision records should show the evidence considered, reviewers involved, legal basis and route for correcting an error.
Criminal networks adapt to controls, so static rules degrade. Firms should analyse confirmed cases and harmless alerts, then test new scenarios with privacy and fairness safeguards. Shared intelligence may help connect activity across institutions, but data quality and access limits remain essential.
Explain restrictions without revealing how to evade detection
Customers whose accounts are restricted should use the firm’s verified complaint and information channels, preserve transfer records and provide a concise explanation of legitimate activity. They should not pay an intermediary who claims it can remove a fraud marker or guarantee restoration of access.
Consumer communication must balance transparency with the risk that detailed rules could help criminals adapt. Firms can still identify the affected service, information needed, review route and expected communication process. Silence or contradictory instructions can push legitimate customers toward impersonators offering false assistance.
The FCA data show more action against suspected mule accounts, not the end of mule activity and not proof that every closure was correct. The strongest operational response combines targeted detection, human review, documented escalation and a workable correction path for customers who can substantiate legitimate transactions across the market.